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Petitioners were indicted and convicted under 18 U. S. C. § 1343 and §1349, wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the wire fraud statutes protect only interests “long . . . recognized as property,” and intangible economic information is not such an interest. McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, 360 (1987); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U. S. 19, 26 (1987).

Petitioners engaged in a scheme to receive preferred government contracts, paying project selection board members in return. Petitioners were indicted and convicted under 18 U. S. C. § 1343 and § 1349, wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Second Circuit affirmed, on the “right to control” theory: controlling the victim’s “information necessary to make discretionary economic decisions.” United States v. Binday, 804 F. 3d 558, 570 (CA2 2015) (alterations omitted). On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the wire fraud statutes protect only interests “long . . . recognized as property,” and intangible economic information are not such an interest. McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, 360 (1987); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U. S. 19, 26 (1987). The text of the statutes has been construed narrow in scope to protect property rights, and Congress subsequently enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which addresses only the intangible right of “honest services,” eliminating the idea that Congress intended wire fraud statutes to address other intangible interests. United States v. Sadler, 750 F. 3d 585, 591 (CA6 2014). Further, the theory relied on expands federal jurisdiction impermissibly, as the theory allows for the trivialization of nearly any deceptive act. See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U. S. 12, 27 (2000). Reversed.