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Department of Human Services v. C.A.M.

“The ‘key inquiry in determining whether condition[s] or circumstances warrant jurisdiction is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a reasonable likelihood of harm to the welfare of the child.’ Dept. of Human Services v. C. Z., 236 Or App 436, 440, 236 P3d 791 (2010).”

• Juvenile Law

Maldonado and Freed

“Marital property” is all the property owned by the parties at the time of dissolution, “and can include property owned prior to marriage. Massee and Massee, 328 Or 195, 201 n 2, 970 P2d 1203 (1999) (citing Pierson). Under ORS 107.105(1)(f), the dissolution court is required to make a distribution of marital property that is “just and proper in all the circumstances.”

• Family Law

State v. Jerscheid

Under ORS 137.542(2), "if a person holds a registry identification card and is sentenced to probation—the probation conditions related to the use of usable marijuana and specified cannabinoid products must comply with the statute."

• Criminal Law

State v. Kreis

Even in the absence of a lawful initial seizure, an order may be justified by legally sufficient officer-safety concerns. State v. Wilson, 283 Or App 823, 828-29, 390 P3d 1114, rev den, 361 Or 801 (2017).

• Criminal Procedure

State v. Leach

"After a patdown, an officer may not conduct a further search unless the officer develops reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the person poses a serious threat of harm and that a further search would lessen or eliminate that threat.'" State v. Davenport, 272 Or App 725, 731, 357 P3d 514, adh'd to as modified on recons, 275 Or App 20, 361 P3d 669 (2015).

• Criminal Procedure

State v. Middleton

“A stop is a seizure that must be justified by reasonable suspicion that a crime or probable cause traffic infraction has been committed; a stop may last only as long as is reasonably required for the officer to complete an investigation.” State v. Rodgers, 219 Or App 366, 370-71, 182 P3d 209 (2008). “Incriminating evidence that police obtain during an unlawful extension of a stop is subject to suppression.” Id.

• Evidence

State v. Wendt

“A witness needs to demonstrate her expertise relative to the topic about which she is asked to make her statement” which can be proven with “specialized knowledge” through professional experience under OEC 702. Meyer v. Harvey Aluminum, 263 Or 487 (1972). State v. Woodbury, 289 Or App 109 (2017).

• Evidence

DHS v. T.L.B.

Even if DHS satisfies the statutory “clear and convincing” evidence required to terminate a parent’s rights, “the court may not terminate a parent’s rights unless clear and convincing evidence also establishes that termination is in the child’s best interests.” ORS 419B.500; State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 145-146, 36 P3d 490 (2001). The evidence is said to be “clear and convincing” when “it makes the existence of a fact highly probable or when it is of extraordinary persuasiveness.” Dept. of Human Services v. R.K., 271 Or App 83, 88, 351 P3d 68, rev den, 357 Or 640 (2015).

• Juvenile Law

State v. Dendy

“For police officers to make a stop, they must reasonably suspect—based on specific and articulable facts—that the person committed a specific crime or type of crime or was about to commit a specific crime or type of crime.” State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or 163, 182, 389 P3d 1121 (2017).

• Criminal Procedure

Sugiyama v. Arnold

“Discussion off the record of matters as to which issues on appeal could raise is ill-advised, either because no official record is made of the matters or because whatever record that is made often is summary in nature.” State v. Williams, 322 Or 620, 624 (1996).

• Civil Procedure

Angle v. Board of Dentistry

The Court will give "primary weight" to the text and context of a statutory provision, but may also consider any useful legislative history to discern and effectuate the legislative intent as reflected in the words of the statute. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009).

• Administrative Law

Capital Card v. Kerr Contractors Inc.

In determining whether a contract provision is ambiguous, the court should review the provision to determine “if it has no definite significance or is capable of more than one plausible – that is, sensible and reasonable – interpretation.” Holloway v. Republic Indemnity Co. of America, 341 Or 642, 650, 147 P3d 329 (2006).

• Contract Law

Morat v. Sunset Village, LLC

The court of appeals “discern[s] [the meaning of statutes based] on the words of the statutes in context and, when helpful, legislative history and other interpretive aids. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Because it is a judicial proceeding, “plaintiff’s attorney fees may still be recoverable under ORS 742.061 in court-annexed arbitration.” Robinson v. Tri-Met, 277 Or App 60, 62 n 3, 370 P3d 864 (2016), rev den, 361 Or 886 (2017).

• Landlord Tenant

State v. Darmola

In Padilla v. Kentucky the Court announced that the obligation to accurately advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a plea not collateral to the criminal defense attorney function, but rather was integral to the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 US 356 (2010).

• Immigration

State v. Hardges

“It is a familiar rule that the meaning of words in a statute may be clarified . . . by reference to other words in the same sentence or provision.” Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering Inc., 359 Or 694, 702, 375 P3d 463 (2016). Here, when reviewing the language of ORS 137.540(1)(m), “the state acknowledges that the text . . . ‘report as required and abide by the direction of the supervising officer’ suggest that the type of ‘direction’ it authorizes probation officers to impose – and that the court may enforce through probation violation proceedings – ‘should generally relate to a probationer’s reporting requirements.’”

• Parole and Post-Prison Supervision

State v. Horseman

“ORS 137.690 imposes a mandatory minimum term of 25 years [300 months] for a person who has been convicted of more than one ‘major felony sex crime,’ a term that includes ‘the crime of using a child in a display of sexually explicit conduct.’” State v. Carey-Martin, 293 Or App 611, 613 (2018).

• Post-Conviction Relief

State v. Olson

The Court will analyze the nature of erroneously admitted testimony in the context of other evidence on the same issue and whether it would be duplicative, cumulative, or unhelpful to the jury. State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33-34, 77 P3d 1111 (2003).

State v. Seidel

A person is considered to have interfered with a peace officer when the person refuses to obey “a lawful order by the peace officer.” ORS 162.247(1). A lawful order is an order “authorized by, and not contrary to, substantive law.” State v. Ausmus, 336 Or 493, 504, 85 P3d 864 (2003).

• Criminal Law

Summerfield v. OLCC

If testimony is scientific, the proponent is “required to comply with the standards for admission of scientific evidence set out in O’Key and * * * Brown[.]” which set out factors to consider when assessing scientific reliability. State v. Henley, 363 Or 284 (2018).

• Evidence

Central Oregon LandWatch v. Deschutes County

Under OAR 660-023-0040(4), “the local government ‘shall analyze the ESEE consequences that could result from decisions to allow, limit, or prohibit a conflicting issue.’ In doing so, the local government, in its ESEE analysis ‘must consider any applicable statewide goal or acknowledged plan requirements, including the requirements of Goal 5.’”

• Land Use

Markstrom v. Guard Publishing Co.

When a court imposes the sanction of dismissal under ORCP 46, the court is required to “explain why that sanction is just.” Pamplin v. Victoria, 319 Or 429 (1994).

• Civil Procedure

State v. Galloway

A trial court can order a retrial limited to the issues that caused the appellate court to reverse the conviction on the greater offense because "A defendant's 'right to trial by jury on all elements of the offenses of which [a defendant] has been convicted' is not violated in that circumstance because the state has proved to 'a jury all elements of the offenses of which he is accused' in the same case." State v. Boots, 308 Or 371, 577-79.

• Criminal Procedure

State v. Garcia

“[A] court will make a sufficient record under Mayfield if the trial court’s ruling, considered in light of the parties’ arguments, demonstrates the court balanced the appropriate considerations.” State v. Anderson, 363 Or 392, 406, 423 P3d 43 (2018).

• Evidence

State v. J.D.H.

When “determining ‘whether a particular search falls within the scope’ of a person’s consent, ‘the trial court will determine, based on the totality of circumstances,’ what the person giving the consent ‘actually intended.’” State v. Blair, 361 Or 527, 537, 396 P3d 908 (2017).

• Criminal Procedure

State v. Lively

When a statue has “several provisions or particulars[,] such construction is, it possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.” ORS 174.010.

• Environmental Law

State v. Homan

“An error in excluding evidence is harmless if there is ‘little likelihood that the error affected the jury’s verdict’” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19 (2003).

• Criminal Law

State v. Keith

In cases where the crimes were “‘committed and investigated at different times and places [, the court examines whether] the later occurring offenses were clearly precipitated by an earlier offense, [thus] rendering evidence of the initial offense ‘necessary to prove and to explain the context and motivation for the [later occurring] events.’” State v. Strouse, 276 ORS App 392, 402.

• Civil Procedure

State v. Rainey

“The prohibitions in subsection (1)(a), (b), or (c) do not apply to subscribers or members of their family who perform the acts prohibited in subsection (1) of this section in their homes.” ORS 165.540(3).

• Evidence

West Hills Development Co. v. Doughman

In deciding whether there is authority to make an agreement, “those dealing with the governmental body must know the extent of their authority.” Harsh Investment Corp. v. State Housing Division, 88 Or App 151, 744 P2d 588 (1987), rev den, 305 Or 273 (1988). The county code and WCRO 2010-098 expressly provided that, “credit eligibility determinations shall be determined by the Director.” WCC 3.17.070 (TDT); WCRO 2010-098, Attachment A, A, § 070 (NBTSDC).

• Contract Law