

**Cloning, Identity, and Human Dignity:
A Response to Kass and Callahan**

Introduction

The general introduction to the special issue on cloning

unique genetic identity, and that a cloned child's dignity is compromised as a result of his being a genetic duplicate. Yet, although these arguments themselves fail to illustrate that

a calico, is stocky and has patches of tan, orange, and white throughout her body, CC barely resembles a calico at all. Not only is CC lanky and thin, she has a grey coat over a white body and is lacking the patches of orange or tan typical to calicos. There are behavioral differences between Rainbow and CC as well; whereas Rainbow is described

1. The *actual* replication of identity_perspective: "Cloning creates serious issues of

nature of human clones that will lead them to want the cloned child to live the life of the genetic predecessor.

Neither one of these interpretations result in a successful argument against

parents fully expected. But there seems to be no harm here done onto JJ and nothing is

music, the reason why the whole tension arises in the first place, is because Katie *is* her own person, with her own mind, and her own likes, dislikes, and goals for the future. Cloning itself, therefore, does *not* violate Katie's individuality; it is her mother's *misconceptions* concerning what a cloned child ought to be like that is responsible for

personal identities (see Callahan, 1999, p. 101). Further, these questions can be used to

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twinning), then we have to identify whether there is some *intrinsic harm* that comes with being an identical multiple. If no such harm can be established, then there is evidence against positing such a right.

Turning to the experiences of multiples can help us answer this question. There does not seem anything *intrinsically* harmful or identity-depriving in being a genetic duplicate. As Elliot writes:

... if cloning is morally objectionable because it would produce non-unique

seem to waver between accepting and rejecting genetic determinis). If identical multiples

50 percent chance of also being gay. For fraternal twins, the rate was about 20 percent. Because identical twins share their entire genetic makeup while fraternal twins share about half, genes were believed to explain the difference.

It cannot be denied, then, that genetic constitution plays a significant role in the development of our personalities. A cloned child will, very likely, display certain behavioral and personality similarities with his genetic ancestor (though there is evidence that twins reared apart displayed a greater divergence in personality and behavior than twins reared together (Lewontin, 1982)). The key question is whether those similarities are sufficient to cause a severe identity crisis. Given the vastly different nurture that cloned children would experience, the answer seems to be no. If similarities in personality between a clone and his genetic predecessor are to cause identity problems, it will not be something inherent in being a clone but, rather, will most likely be the result of parental and societal expectations. That is, the second reading of Kass' objection may accurately point to a danger for cloned children, but that danger does not arise from

London: Knickerbocker Press, 1982. Kass' objection to human cloning and the

philosophers, for example Immanuel Kant, have argued that human beings have moral status, higher than that of nonhuman animals, because of our rational abilities, and our capacity for moral agency. A cloned human being would certainly possess those traits as

human reproductive cloning, not the unwarranted alarmist objections that Kass and Callahan proffer.