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According to what Rebecca Roach calls *the common-sense view* what matters for survival is identity.¹ Parfit has challenged this view, citing cases in which identity is interrupted but we should say that persons nevertheless survive. If, for example, I were to divide into two persons, each psychologically continuous with me now, I should regard this as survival even though I cannot, logically, be identical with both of my successors.

Roach suggests that David Lewis' response to Parfit in defense of the common-sense view fails because, given the character of personnel involved in branching cases, we cannot infer that what matters for their survival is what matters for us. While pre-fission stage-sharing allows persons to survive fission, such cases tell us nothing about what matters for survival for ordinary people or about the correctness of the common-sense view.

The puzzle cases on which Parfit and Lewis rely force us to reflect on the nature of our concern for our future survival. According to Roach, however, we cannot have such concern in the requisite sense if our survival is guaranteed. Since the survival of individuals involved in fission cases is guaranteed through fission, the claims, they cannot be concerned about their survival in the requisite sense.

I argue however that given the criterion for individuating persons and the account of self-interested concern she assumes, both ordinary people and those destined to undergo fission are in the same boat. Our survival, like theirs, is guaranteed but given any reasonable understanding of self-interested concern, neither we nor they should be sanguine about that. To the extent that we are concerned about our futures and, in particular, about our future survival our concern is the same.

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Now Roach argues that individuals who undergo fission must, logically, survive fission because persons who share a pre-fission stage S, "owe their very existence to the fact that S fissions: if they exist at all, they survive until after fission." Suppose fission had not occurred. Then there would have been just one person rather than two people all along. And *that* individual is not identical with either one of the cohabiting individuals involved in the fission case. If fission *hadn't* occurred than those two individuals would not have existed. Since they exist it follows that fission occurred. Since fission could not have occurred if they hadn't survived the fission it follows that they, those very individuals, logically *must* survive fission. Their survival, Roach argues, unlike that of ordinary people, 'cannot be jeopardized.'

If we don't find this persuasive, she suggests, it is because even though their survival is guaranteed they are not in a position to *know* that it is. To know that would be to know at some time t prior to fission that one was half of a cohabiting pair of individuals *who are*

predicament as C1 and C2 in the fission case: these counterparts are now indiscernible so I don't know which one I am. But the field will soon narrow as the future unfolds.

I worry about my forthcoming dental appointment (11am Aug 3). At my exam, Dr. Tulenko assured me that I needed extensive dental work so the possibili

While I do not think that there is a shred of plausibility in this objection, even if there were it would cut no ice. Suppose we reject counterpart theory. Suppose we hold that it is *possible* that the very same individual (in the strict and philosophical sense) have any one of a variety of different fates. One fate that an individual *cannot* have even on this account, short of violating transitivity of identity, is that of becoming two distinct individuals. E -196 1() 2719e) Tm (

be C^* . So *C cannot die at t^** ! C 's survival past t^* is therefore guaranteed in just the way and for just the same reasons that the survival of C_1 and C_2 through fission is guaranteed!³

Like all normal persons, C is concerned about his survival. But his survival is guaranteed in just the way that the survival of C_1 and C_2 through fission is guaranteed. If something had happened to result in the death of an individual who shared C 's stages prior to t^* then C would not have existed! If C exists then his survival through t^* and, indeed, his survival to t is guaranteed.

Can C be properly concerned about his future survival given that it is, in this sense, guaranteed and cannot be jeopardized? Well, he can be concerned in the very same way and to the very same extent, that ordinary persons like you can me can be concerned because he is an ordinary, non-fissioning person. But his concern about future survival is the same kind of concern that other individuals whose survival cannot be jeopardized, including the personnel of fission cases, exhibit.